O’Conall Street

Mark Durkan has made some interesting comments on the final phase of negotiations which were unfolding this day ten years ago. Readers will note his rebuttal of several points made by Jonathan Powell in his recent book. After three decades of conflict I agree with Mark when he describes the agreements overwhelming endorsement by the people of Ireland as the emancipation of hope. 

• The concept of a joint office of equal First Ministers was inspired by the pictures of Seamus Mallon and David Trimble consoling families in Poyntzpass, Co Armagh after the LVF shot dead two best friends – a Catholic and a Protestant – in Canavan’s bar on 3 March 1998, only weeks before the Agreement.  The moving story of Damian Trainor and Philip Allen’s friendship touched us like a parable for a new society.

• Downing Street faxed a draft Strand One outcome exclusively to David Trimble and John Hume on the evening of 30 March and a revised version on the morning of 31 March.  The SDLP believed the text reflected David Trimble’s conversations with Jonathan Powell.  It was no basis for negotiation never mind agreement.  We established that George Mitchell (the Talks Chair), Mo Mowlam, Paul Murphy (Strand 1 Chair) and the Irish Government knew nothing of this approach.  John Hume flew to London on 31 March.  He told Tony Blair that we would not negotiate with a fax machine, insisted on inclusive negotiations and that the Prime Minister should join the all-party Talks in Belfast if he wanted to contribute anything.  The Downing Street paper was withdrawn. 

• Despite Seamus Mallon’s persistent efforts, other parties, for different reasons, did not want to negotiate the policing issue.  This necessitated the creation of an independent commission as part of the Agreement. The success of the new beginning to policing has vindicated the Patten Commission and reflects well on the leadership of the PSNI, the Policing Board (not least its independent members) and the good work of the police Ombudsman.  The SDLP, especially our Policing Board members, can take credit in driving the implementation of Patten.  We resisted flawed legislation from Peter Mandelson and insisted on the pace and pattern of change set out by Patten.  The SDLP helped to ensure, against the odds, that the new policing arrangements, for some time, were the most successful working feature of the Agreement.

• A formula for “sufficient consensus” was a necessary confidence measure in the agreed rules for the Talks themselves.  Why do some find it exceptional or objectionable that such cross-community decision-making protections were also built into the outcome of those Talks? 

• The SDLP resisted all attempts to make “decommissioning” a condition of ministerial office in Strand One.  We were alarmed when, later, the decommissioning text cross-referred to the exclusion provisions of Strand One.  We immediately highlighted the dangers to both governments only to be told by the Irish Government that it was their wording and all would be ok.

• Parties were told that the language of “using… influence…” on decommissioning was to accommodate Sinn Fein who were saying that clearer mandatory wording would make it harder to them to sell any agreement.  We were also told by both Governments that they had “real commitments” from Sinn Fein.  Government figures also told parties that the end-date for prison releases of the end of June 2000 was deliberately later than the end date for decommissioning of May 2000. 

• Tony Blair inherited a good hand on Northern Ireland when he came to office and deserves huge credit for playing it well in getting the Agreement.  However, his side-letter to David Trimble on Good Friday and his distortive intervention during the referendum started the rot as far as authoritative interpretation and proper implementation was concerned. 

• The Agreement’s overwhelming endorsement – North and South – on 22 May 1998 was the high-water mark for democratic consensus and constitutional legitimacy in Ireland.  From that point “the process” should have been the inclusive institutions and those institutions “the process”.  Instead, the two governments put the premium on an ulterior process outside the institutions starring two parties, rather than the inclusive institutions themselves.  Suspension never occurred as a result of the institutional workings but because of failures in the process as managed by the two Governments.  The McCartney sisters, in early 2005, taught the experts and handlers a lesson in how to make the Provisional movement move. 

• John Hume and Seamus Mallon used to complain to Tony Blair about his dealings and side-dealing – with Sinn Fein and David Trimble only serving to frustrate the Agreement.  He replied “You guys, your problem is you don’t have guns”.  I utterly refute Jonathan Powell’s attempts to rewrite that counsel of cynicism against Seamus Mallon.   

• The SDLP said in 1998 that we designed the Agreement to ensure partnership between those who voted ‘yes’ and those who voted ‘no’ as well as between Unionists and Nationalists, and so it is proving. We now have a settled process as all parties, at last, accept power-sharing, north-south structures and a reformed police service. We must not revert to the stop-go process that hampered the Agreement for too long. Of course, our problems are not all behind us. The Good Friday Agreement endorsed by the people, was the emancipation of hope. Our task is the emancipation of opportunity.”

This entry was posted on Wednesday, April 9th, 2008 at 11:44 am and is filed under Business, Current Affairs, Good Friday Agreement 10 years on, Politics, Public Affairs, Public Relations, The Media. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.